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UNITED STATES AS A MONETARY UNION:
A LESSON FOR EUROPE?

Introduction
Thirteen North American colonies gained independence from the United Kingdom
of Great Britain in'1783, four years later the states agreed upon a constitution and
set up a federation. Soon afterwards, with the election of the first president in 1789,
the new nation established a well functioning central government However, the
country had no single currency until 1879 and no central banlc "!ll1tiI1913. Nevertheless, in spi~e ofthe absence of institutions that are these days frequently perceived
in the European Union (ED) as attributes of a powerful nation, the United States
managed to settle vast new territories, develop new industries, as well as, wage and
win wars. Consequently, at the time the Federal Reserve Banlc (Fed) was created,
the nation was already a recognized economic and political superpow,er. America's.
entry into the first world war tipped the scale in favor ofthe Entente and president.
Wilson was in a position to play key role in the post-war peace conference.
,
Overall, the American experience shows that a political entity can play aglobal role without a central banlc and a well established national currency. The factor
that determines a country's importance is its political cohesion - the US ~njoyed
a very well functioning democracy and a central government, especially the executive branch, a long time before the American dollar attained an important economic
role all over the world.
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On the other hand, Europeans seem to hold the opposite view, the founding of
a central bank and the creation of a common cun-ency are seen as major steps in the
process of political unification. Consequently, as a result of the Maastricht Treaty, on
the one hand, the European Union has no representatiye government (the European
Parlianient enjoys very· limited powers, especially regarding the executive branchthe European Commission), but, on the other, the region has a single cun-ency issued
by a central bank totally ind~pendent of any political, national or Europe-wide, entity and a set of strict rules that govern fiscal policies. In sum, a "democracy deficit"
coexists with rules and regulations that bind still sovereign nations, a development
hardly conducive to building a cohesive, super-national political structure.

Optimum Currency Area
In hindsight we call. analyze the introduction of a single cun-ency and a central bank
in the United States in the light of optimum currency area (OCA) theory, a concept
developed only decades la~er (Mundell 1961, McKinnon 1963, and Kenen 1969).
The theory postulates that regions can benefit from a common cun-ency, if they
trade. a great deal among· themselves, there exists a very high· degree of mobility of
factors ofproduction among them, and there is a mechanism that allows for monetary transfers aimed at softening asymmetric, i.e. region or industry specific, shocks
"
(frequently referred to as "fiscal federalism").
As of late 19th century, the United States met the above criteria reasonably
well. Trade within the country by far exoeeded the nation's foreign economic relations and there was a high degree of competition in factor markets. At the time
labor was relatively homogenous and very mobile, and product markets were not
overly monopolized (fither. The only missing factor was fiscal federalism, but also
no other nation at the time used fiscal policy to transfer resources from booming
, parts of the country to regions suffering from recessions. In other words, the American monetary union created no handicap in this respect.
The introduction of a common currency required practically no change to
the overall working of the economy, too, because at the time the entire developed
world was on the gold standard. In othe~ words, most of the world was on a fixed
exc~ange rate system and ad.opting a single cun"ency (akin to fi'{ing exchange rates
among the different currencies circulating within the United States) made tlittle difference. Additionally, the gold standard allowed no room for discretioniry monetary policy, i.e. the adoption of a common currency meant no loss ofra mechanism
useful in addressing economic shocks.
Overall, American monetary unification and the establishment of the Fed resulted in a small change in the overall economic environment and the events caused"
little, if any, loss of efficiency. On "the other hand, American monetary unification
resulted in the elimination of any risk related to businesses operating with more
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than one currency; i.e. most likely, presented a small gain. Moreover, the creation of
the Federal Reserve System, which had a clear mandate to perform the function oflender of last result, made the whole American banking system potentially more s~able.
It is also worth noting that the American monetary unification coincided with
the "first wave of globalization" (Baldwin and Martni 1999), a period characterized
with international capital flows that (in relative terms) dwarfed even those of the
present time (Crafts 2000). Therefore, by joining the gold standard the US Wlls able
to attract foreign capital, a resource that the nation lacked very much. Consequently,
it is not surprising that economists who analyzed monetary history of the United
. States (Friedman and Schwartz 1963, Meltzer 2003) noted no significant change in
American economic perfonnance following the introduction of a common currency.
Unlike in Europe before and after 1999, the monetary union required no significant
adjustment in either economic policy or in the functioning of individual markets
(labor and product).
However, between late 19th and late 20th centuries economic reality, economic theory, and economic policies changed enormously. First, the structure of
American economy ch~ged from a relatively simple system based on agriculture,
mining, and commodity-type products into a highly sophisticated organism based
on diverse services and high-tech indus~es. Consequently, particular regions are
specialized and labor force is characterized with more diverse skills and knowledge,
developments that make labor mobility more difficult. On top of that, factor markets attained a higher level of monopolization and, as a result, their prices became
more rigid. Not surprisingly, Tootell (1990) found that today the US no more ~a
tisfies .crityria for an optimum currency area and, therefore, certain regions suffer
prolonged periods of high unemployment resulting from asymmetrie shocks. .
Secondly, following the collapse of the gold standard a huge change has
taken place in domestic and international monetary arrangements. The demise of
a lin1e between the stock of gold held by the central bank and the amount of money'
in circulation signaled the beginning of discretionary monetary policy and its use
to rectify economic problems. The downfall of the gold standard also spelled out
the end of a fixed exchange rate system and the possible exploitation of currency
depreciation in handling trade imbalances and in tackling the underutilization of
economic resources. In sum, the general economic environment haslchanged dramatically; on one hand, ~actor markets that used to be very competitive and flexible
developed into quite rigid ones and, on the other, monetary policy and exchange
rates that used to be rigid b~came flexible and perceived as important tools of economic policy.
The following two sections provide a review ofthe use of both monetary and
fiscal policies in the US wit~ an eye towards the working of the American monetarf
union.
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Role of monetary policy in the US economy

Since the early 1980s, in the US, monetary policy has been used to' address, shortte;rrn economic shocks, while fiscal policy has been employed to accomplish l"mgternl'goals, for instance to stimulate economic growth (Meyer 2000). However, in
a monetary union, the central ban1e has difficulties in addressing regiot;l.al (or industrY ~pecific) shocks without possibly creating adverse conditions in other regions
(industries). In particular, expansionary monetary policy aimed at stimulating growth in a depressed region may very well create excessive demand in regions enjoying robust growth and, thus, contribute to inflationary pressures. Therefore, the
, central monetary authority may frequently face trade offs, for instance, between
price stability and economic growth or between the value of domestic currency and
employment. Because the Fed is accountable for its actions, the bank needs guidance from the control1in~ entity (Congress) in resolvillg these dilemmas.
Most recently, the Congress defined goals of monetary policy when it ad~
opted the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act (commonly known as the
Humphrey-Hawkins Act) in 1978. The law set three objectives for the Fed: affordable long-term interest rates, full employment, and price stability. Because the
first aim is a medium for attaining the s'econd, it is commonly assumed that the
central bank has "twin goals" of price stability and full employment.
It is important to stress that, although the Humphrey-Hawkins Act contained
specific numerical targets, the Congress realized that the goals were overly ambitious and did not penalize the Fed for not meeting them within the prescribed
time. Give!! this fiasco, the Congress has refrained from micromanaging economic
policy and has never specified inflation and employment targets since. Similarly,
th~ Fed'has also avoided'setting specific aims for itself; however, it has had internal
'working definitions of price stability. It is widely assumed that the ballie currently
de~es price stability as the rate of core inflation of about 2 percent. l In sum, on one
hand, the American central ban1e has a great deal oflatitude in conducting monetary
policy and, on the other, the Congress continuously monitors economic conditions
~nd exerts pressure on the Fed through semi-annual hearings.
The Fed is required by law to present the legislative power with written reports prior to the hearings held separately by the two chambers. Additionally, Fed
executives, including the Chairman, may be summoned to testify before,.each of
the chambers of Congress at any time. These meetings serve not only the purpose
of assessing the work of the ban1e, but also of getting the bank's input into new legislation. Similarly, top executives of the Fed regularly meet with highest officials
at the Department of Treasury. These sessions allow for exchange of opinions and
,
,I Core inflation is defined as the overall consumer price levelless prices of food and energy. Prices of
these items tend to be volatile and by eliminating them from the consumer price index the Fed is able to focus
on long-term trends in price movements.
'

-
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analyses, rather than offer the executive branch an opportunity to ex{)rt pressure on
the central ballie. It is very important to stress that the hearings and required reporting'make the Fed fully accountable for its actions. However, the bank is responsible to the general public and the legislative power, not the executive; therefore, .
there is little danger of the president using monetary policy for short-term political
ends, for instance to stimulate the economy before elections. This threat is very
much stressed by Nordhaus (1975); however, most economists (for instatree, McCallum, 1978,Alesina, 1989) dismiss this hypothesis.
From the above, it is clear that the American central bank enjoys economic but not political independence. According to Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991) the former denotes freedom to choose specific tools of monetary policy (Debelle and Fisher (1994) cal~ this instrument independence) that are used in
accomplishing specific targets (goals in the Debelle and Fisher taxonomy) set by
another body, in this case, the US Congress. This is consistent with practice in most
other developed nations and Debelle and Fisher conclude that this arrangement is
most efficient.
.
Milton Friedman (1968) postulated. adhering to a rule in conducting monetary policy, i.e. increasing money supply by a fixed amount consistent with the longterm rate of economic growth and the natural rate of unemployment, commonly
. known as Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment - NAIRD. This great
economist argued that discretionary monetary policy is ineffective, because, on one
hand, given rational expectations, the central ballie is unable to increase the rate of
economic growth (in the long-run, an excessive increase in money supply results
olliy in a higher price level with no increase in the level of real activity - the socalled neutrality ofmoney), and, on the other, monetary policy may not be effective
in stimulating a sluggish economy because of an unknown lag between a policy
change and the impact of a new level of money supply on the economy. ill other
words, a monetary stimulus may take effect only when the economic problem is
already gone, and, thus, would only contribute to inflation. In spite of his view that
olliy money matters, Friedman did not advocate· discretionary monetary policy.
However, actions of the Federal Reserve Bank over the last quarter of
a c~ntury clearly show that discretionary monetary policy is effective in combating
demand-side shocks. During the tenure ofAlan Greenspan as the F6d's Chairman,
the bank frequently changed the target level of short-term interest rates in order to
preempt adverse effects of economic disturbances.
/
Moreover, as Greenspan (2904) himself stresses, the very significant permanent decrease In NAIRU, from about 6 percent to about 5 percent, that tookplace in
the latter half of the 1990s was possible only because ofa very substantial monetary expansion (Graph 1). Not surprisingly, Benj~ririnFriedman (2006) summarized
the Greenspan years at the Fed's helm as a triumph of discretion over rule.

- -
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Unfortunately, over the same period, the Eurozone failed to record a siinilar
success in bringing unemployment down in spite of a very significant decline in
inflation and, consequently, a large decrease in long-term interest rates (Graphs 1
and 2).
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Inflation targeting in the US
At this juncture it is important to add that, most likely, successes in keeping the
US economy out of long periods of recession and in lowering NAIRU would not
have been possible with the Fed attempting to attain a single goal, that of keeping
inflation low. Blinder (2004) makes thls point crystal clear stating:
It would take a great deal to convince me that U.S. monetary policy since 1979 - that's
twenty-four years, under two Fed chairmen - would have bee-\1 better, if only we had I instituted'
inflation targeting back then and stuck with it thick and thin. (p. 32)

Moreover, the author is convinced that
[t]he starkly different legal mandates of the European Central Banle (BCB) and the Fed
have [ ... Jallowed Greenspan to gamble on growth in a way that the more cautious ECB (and the

. I
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Bundesbank before that} was'unwilling to do. This is one, though not the only, reason the United
States outperformed Europe in the 1990s (p. 31).

Another important issue is the fact that the Fed showed a' good deal offiexibility in targeting inflation. As I mentioned earlier, the Fed has never set a specific
goal for an acceptable increase in the consumer price index. This strategy allowed
the bank plenty of freedom in addressing this very important issue.
, First of all, the Fed has never found itself in a position that it would have
to sacrifice employment to prevent inflation exceeding a stated target, especially
when commodity prices started to rise ~fter 2000. Second, even more important,
the Fed has never fallen into the trap of attaining zero inflation.
Following the 1970s, a period of stagflation, many economists emphasized
the negative impact of inflation on the economy. Indeed, there are important efficiency losses resulting from a high level of price increases (Bernholz 2003) and,
the expepences ofthatperiorl reinforced the belief widely held above all in Germany that price stability is the most important goal of monetary policy (Stern 1999).
However, ,this is by no means an established, economic truth. For instance, Barro
(1997) showed that inflation hinders economic growth only at high levels, those
exceeding 15 percent per year. His study is based on an analysis of 117 countries
and, given the Balassa-Samuelson effect (Balassa 1964, Samuelson 1964), may be
less applicable to mature economIes. Nevertheless, many central banks in developed countries aim at a rate of ~nfiation within: the range of 1-3 percent (Collins and,
Siklos 2004). On the other hand, the ECB established a very ambitious target of no
mo~e than 2 percent average price increase, and B1anchar~ (2003) and Lamy and
Pisani-Ferry (2002) argue that the bank should increase its target for illflation.
There are strong arguments in favor of the higher (1-3 percent) level of price
changes. For instance, a low level of inflation is helpful in speeding up adjustments
in real wages, a process necessary in restoring competitiveness of particular industries or entire nations, following an asymmetric shock. a world with no price
increases~ real wages decline only when n,ominal wages go down - a task very difficult to accomplish, because employees resist decreases in nominal ~ages, a fact
commonly referred to as nominal wage downward rigidity. Bowever, with some
price rises it is sufficient to keep nominal wages fixed for real wages to decline.
Akerloff, Dickens, and Perry (1996) estimate that inflation of just 2 percent per
year practically eliminates the problem of downward nominal wage rigidity,
, Additionally, some inflation also helps in lowering real minimum wage, if
the nominal minimum wage is held constant. Because inflation has been higher
in the United States than in Europe, the minimum wage in the US declined much
faster than in the ED and Gordon (2004) believes that this drop is a major cause for
the unemployment rate in America being much lower than in the,EU.

In
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There is yet another very important issue that the Fed has had in mind while
targeting inflation - zero-bound interest rates. After the very'bad'experiences with
inflation in the 1970s, the 1990s brought again to central bankers' attention the question of deflation. Beginning with the early 1990s, Japan has gone through a period
of declining prices and extremely slow economic growth. When prices keep going
down, even if the central bank lowers nominal interest rates to zero, real interest
rates remain positive and, because of that, monetary policy may lose 'its power to,
stimulate the economy.
Ahearne et al (2002) agree that Japan's experience shows thatstimulating
the economy is more difficult and more uncertain once deflation'sets in. These days
deflation is perceived as a greater threat to economic prosperity than inflation (for
instance, Kumar, et al. 2003, Coenen, Orphanides, and Wieland 2004). For this reason, many central bankers believe that having a positive rate of price rises provides
them with a margin for error. In case the economy slows down and there 'emerges
a threat of deflationary spiral, the ban1e can drastically lower interest rates to keep
the real interest rate close to zero, or even make it negative. The Fed adopted this
type of monetary policy following the stock market crash of2000 and, by doing so,
most likely, prevented the American economy from slipping into a deep recession.

Graph 2
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The question remains, what is the "safe" level of inflation, i.e. a speed of
price increases that would give the central bank a large enough cushion to avoid
a positive real interest rate, even when the nominal interest rate is set at nil. To
address this issue it is worth mentioning that reported price increases overestimate
actual inflation, because of problems with measuring price changes. First of all, we
fail to account properly for the impact of quality improvements on price increases
(Kokoski 1993), and, second, consumers tend to substitute cheaper prodm:ts for
more expensive ones (Aizcorbe and Jacknian 1993). For the above reasons, it is widely believed that in the US repqrted price changes overestimate inflation by about
1 percent per year (Moulton 1993). In other words, this is the absolute minimum of
price changes and on top of t~at should come the cushion against the zero-bound
interest rates. For instance 0rPhanides and Wieland (1998) estimate that the danger
of monetary policy ineffectiveness goes away when inflation reaches 2 percent per
annum. All the above do indeed support the view that for a mature economy to the
like of the US or the Eurozone, inflation in the range of 1-3 percent is optimal.
. Also economic reality points in this direction, because economic growth in
the Eurozone failed to respond to a very significant, post-Maastricht decrease in
inflation. The average rate of growth in the Eurozone was substantially below that
experienced in the re~ion during the decade leading to the Maastricht Treaty and
that recorded in the US over the same period. This was the case, both, during the
time of convergence (1993-1998) and after the introduction of the single currency
on January 1, 1999. (See Graph 2, where GDP deflator is used as a measure of
inflation.)·
.

Effectiveness of American monetary policy

Overall, economic reality shows that, over the last 25 years, the American monetary policy has performed well in keeping the ~conomy out of trouble. During this
period America has managed to reverse the economic convergence process that had
been present over the previous quarter of a century. Until the late 1970s the standard of living (after adjusting for the difference in price levels, i.e. at the purchasing
. power parity) of the future Eurozone had been quickly catching up w'ith that of the
US; however, beginning with the early 1980s the gap has begun to increase again.
(See Graph 3, where the term Eurozone indicates the original eleven EMU members plus Greece).
.
Moreover, long-term projections indicate a fUrther decline in relative economic power of the two largest economic blocks. OEeD (2005) predicts that by .
2020 the gap between the average GDP per capita in the Eurozone and the US will
increase to 37.5% and that the disparity will grow further by 10% over the following decade.
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Graph 3
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This. accomplishment was possibie thanks to,. among other factors, the use .
of monetary policy in combating demand-side shocks. The Fed and the controlling
institution (Congress) as well as the executive branch worked well together' and
managed to keep the American economy growing at a robust rate and to attain a low .
levei of unemployment. Monetary policy has been geared towards attaining these
goals, as well as, towards maintaining low inflation. In the US neither full employment nor price stability enjoys primacy --:- these two goals are seen complimentary.
Monetary policy is aimed towards price stability and the minimization of efficiency
losses resulting from price increases, but, at the same time, is' flexible enough to
amortiz.e demand-side shocks and to foster real wage r;::tte adjustments and, thus,
support continuous growth in income and employment.

Fiscal federalism
In the US, fiscal policy is also designed to support the monetary union. The federal

government collects most taxes and federal taxes are used to finance numerous
programs, but Washington also makes transfers to state- and local governments ..
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As a result, if a region is going through recession and its income goes down, the
amount of taxes it sends to Washington declines, but the amount of transfers from
the f~deral government does not change. Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1992) estimate
that this "auto~natic" decrease in contributions to the central government combined
with no loss of federal aid may absorb up to 40 percent of an adverse asymmetric
shock. In case of a very severe regional recession (or a natural disastyr), the federal
government may directly aid the affected area further decreasing the pain. Another
issue is federal help to underdeveloped regions. Such progquns oper~te at a much
greater scale than similar assistance in the EU.
Another important feature of American monetary union is absence of any
restrictions on the level of budget deficit or debt level. For iJ.;lstance, in 1986 the
state of Louisiana had a budget deficit equal to 5 percent of its revenue and the
shortfall grew to 18 percent in 1988. However, this development caused no concern in Washington, because the federal government has" no responsibility for local
government debts. Eichengreen and von Hagen (1996) analyzed the question of restrictions on the conduct of fiscal policy on sub-national levels among nations with
a federal political structure and concluded that restriction on deficit and debt levels .
are usually imposed when the local government has no power to tax. In such a situation, the federal government collects all taxes and is also responsible for debts of
local governments; therefore, it should be able to set limits on local governments'
borrowing. In the US taxes are also collected at the state level and there is no reaspn
to impose federal limits on states' ability to issue debt.2
The very fact that the states face no artificiaL restriction on their ability to
acquire debt does not mean that there is no incentive for state governments to keep .
their books balanced. However, it is the mar1~et that enforces fiscal discipline, not
the bureaucrats. Goldstein and Woglom (1992) show that the yield on bonds issued by entities that tolerate high deficits or have high debt levels are higher than
on securities sold by local governments showing a more conservative approach to
spending. In other words, the market in)poses a higher interest rate on less. fiscally
conservative governments.
It is important to stress that the United States exhibit a great deal of national
'cohesion and, consequently, transfers from rich to less fortunate regions' face less
opposition than in other countries. Overall, federal taxation and transfers alleviate
the effects of asymme~c shocks and provide assistance to less developed regions.

2 It is WOlth noting that with one exception all American states adopted amendments requiring the state
government to maintain balanced budgets. Nevertheless, the wording ofthose amendments inmost cases allows
the state government to circumvent the restriction and states frequently run budget deficits.
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Lessons for the European Union?
As stated above, present day United States does not meet criteria for an optimum
currency area. Numerous studies show that the European Union is even less suited for such an arrangement (for instance, Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1993, Artis,
Kohler, and M6litz 1998). The main reasons for this surprising conclusion is an
insufficient level of openness, susceptibility to asymmetric shocks (i.e. insufficient
economic convergence), low mobility oflabor, and a lack of fiscal federalism. Unfortunately, in the case of the EU, none ofihe above problems can be easily overcome.
First, there is no plan or desire to increase taxation at the EU level, because
fiscal federalism implies continuous transfers of purchasing power from wealthy
nations to less advanced regions. Europe does not exhibit sufficient unity and because of that persistent transfers fi'om one nation to another are not an option that
is easily acceptable for political reasons. For instance, in Italy persistent transfers
from the North to the South are tearing the nation apart. It is even more difficult to
envision handing over additional resources from the affluent North to, for instance,
Romania. Allother avenue of adjustment, labor mobility, is limited not only because oflinguistic and cultural differences, but also because of, for instance, rigid real
estate markets.
Different levels of development ~ak~ the whole of the European Union prone to asymmetric shocks. These kinds of shocks would go away with fast economic
convergence. (If ,all regions were similar, then an external negative shock would
disturb the entire area to the same extent and an identical remedy would also apply to all regions.) The prospects for full convergence are not certain, however.
De Grauwe' (2000) makes a splendid case for convergence, but Krugman's (1991,
1993) arguments that integration leads to regional specialization are also very persuasive. If the latter view prevails, then the prospects for the European Monetary
Union (EMU) are not very good, because the alternative mechanisms needed to
alleviate the pain caused by asymmetric shocks are fiscal federalism and labor mobility (see above).
The use of monetary policy in addressing economic shocks is also q~estio
nable. Maastricht Treaty clearly placed price stability at the top of the European
Central1;3ank's priorities and the bank has been very finn in its commivnent to
fighting inflation. On numerous occasions the ECB stated th?-t keeping prices stable is the greatest contribution the bank could make to assure full employment and
robust economic growth, and, as a result, inflation in the EU has been below that
in the US. Nevertheless, a lower rate of price increases and, consequently, a lower
interest rate that many members of the EMU now enjoy has failed to translate into
a 1110re vigorous economy and a lower unemployment rate (Graphs 1 and 2). As
a result, Europe has been losing ground in her race for economic hegemony with
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the United States (Graph 3). UnfOliunately, there is little prospect for a change in
the attitude of the ECB, because the banIe is totally independent of any national
or Europe-wide power. A change in its status would require an amendment to the
Maastricht Treaty, a procedure that would need approval of all Member States.
Finally, it is worth noting that the Maastricht Treaty did not obiige the ECB
to play the role of lender of last resort. Therefore, the entire European financial
system is deficient in this respect. Although the ECe very much increased4ending
to European banIcs during'the recent liquidity crisis resulting from problems with
mortgage-backed securities, yet, it is unclear whether or not the ECE would actually use its resources to bail out the banking system, if a full-blown crisis erupts.

Conclusions

The United States adopted a single currency and joined the gold standard, i.e. fi-'
xed the dollar's exchange rate and gave up control over monetary policy when such
a change necessitated little economic adjustment. At the time factor markets were
highly competitive and the adjustment process occurred through changes in prices
and wages. On the other hand, the European Monetary Union was adopted at a time
when rigid factor markets made variable exchange rates and discretionary monetary policy attractive tools in healing economic imbalances and absorbing economic
shocks. If European factor markets do not regain a high degree of flexibility and
the EU does not introduce fiscai federalism, then the monetary union will result in
a significant loss of efficiency, which will inevitably lead to slow economic growth
and persistently high unemployment rates. Unfortunately, the experience of the
entire post-Maastricht period, especially the last 9 years, does not point to a quick
reversal ofthe adverse effects ofthe EMU on European economic performance. So
far, the Eurozone has been recording,very sluggish growth and high unemployment'
levels. Moreover, several nations have been exceeding defiCit and debt levels and
the ECB has been unable to keep inflation within the stated target. Continuation of
these trends will certainly put enormous pressure on the EMU and may lead to its
collapse.
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